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Abstract
This paper discusses some of the challenges that organizations face when implementing
enterprise systems. A small-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within the
Asia-Pacific region was studied using critical ethnography. In this study it was found that
organizational learning around strategically important issues failed to occur. This paper
suggests the theory of organizational defensive routines for understanding how
organizational learning may be hindered during the implementation of enterprise systems.
Keywords: Enterprise Systems Failure, ERP, Defensive Routines, Ethnography

1. Introduction
This paper discusses some of the challenges that organizations face when implementing
enterprise systems. In particular, we focus on how organizational learning around
strategically important issues may fail to occur. This paper contributes to the literature on the
implementation of enterprise systems and to the literature on IS implementation failure more
generally (Larsen et al. 1999; Myers 1994; Sauer 1999).
There were many political issues surrounding the development and implementation of the
enterprise system. In this organization, enterprise integration was a corporate battle ground –
it was the issue over which a political conflict between two camps was fought. Our analysis
shows that the new ERP system was designed to support a future corporate world and work
environment that never arrived. The strategic assumptions that had driven the dream of
enterprise integration were no longer valid just a few years later. Issues that could have been
debated productively were not because of the failure to overcome organizational defensive
routines.
The organization was a small-to-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within
the Asia-Pacific region, called Stark (all names are pseudonyms in accordance with a
confidentiality agreement). Stark was one of many subsidiaries within the Solteria group (one
of the global 500 companies with annual revenues of more than US$4 billion). One of the
authors studied Stark using critical ethnography.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the research literature on
enterprise systems. In Section 3 we discuss our theoretical framework. Section 4 explains our
research method. In Section 5 we present our data on the history of enterprise integration at
Stark. Section 6 analyzes the data. The final section is the conclusion.
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2. Literature Review
Defining Enterprise Systems
ERP systems, or “enterprise systems” for short, have been defined as “comprehensive,
packaged software solutions [that] seek to integrate the complete range of a business’
processes and functions in order to present a holistic view of the business from a single
information and IT architecture” (Gable 1998). In practice, however, companies with
multiple sites may have different ERP configurations (Bhattacherjee 2000; Markus et al.
2000a). The conglomerate we studied, for example, was a large, highly diversified
international conglomerate. Its various subsidiaries had over a dozen different ERP systems
from all the major vendors! In this kind of situation, the concept of one tightly integrated
package for the entire enterprise is not feasible (although it may be feasible for individual
companies within the conglomerate to have one ERP system).
A somewhat broader definition of ERP is offered by Shanks and Seddon (2000). Focusing
more on the shared information and data flows that enable integration of enterprise-wide
processes, they define ERP as: “comprehensive packaged software solutions that integrate
organizational processes through shared information and data flows.”
Enterprise Systems Implementation
Recent research has emphasized the importance of the social, cultural and organizational
aspects in ERP implementation (e.g., Krumbholz et al. 2001; Larsen et al. 1999; Lee et al.
2003; Markus et al. 2000b; Soh et al. 2000). For example, Hanseth and Braa (1999) studied
the ability of one organization to change after the ERP had been implemented. They found
that the dream of standardization was like “hunting for the treasure at the end of the rainbow”
(Hanseth et al. 1999, p. 121). Other IS researchers have focused specifically on the role of
power and politics in ERP implementations (Allen et al. 2001; Koch 2001).
There are several ways enterprise systems may support, enable or constrain certain corporate
strategic initiatives (Davenport 2000b; Markus et al. 2000b). For example, SAP assumes a
translation from strategy to strategic objectives to key performance indicators to the key
processes that are in turn supported by the SAP system (SAP 2001). This translation is
assumed to be one way, from strategy to processes. In SAP’s worldview, the relationship
between strategy, critical success factors, general (key) performance indicators, measurable
performance indicators, processes and sub-processes is central to the implementation of an
enterprise system. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
In analyzing the relationship between strategy and business processes, SAP has been
influenced by Porter’s value chain (Porter et al. 1985). In Figure 2, for example, SAP
promotes the benefits of an enterprise systems implementation by using Porter’s value chain
concept.
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Analyze your Performance Indicators
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Figure 1 - Relationship between Strategy, Strategic Objectives, Critical Success Factors, General (Key)
Performance Indicators and Measurable Performance Indicators (adapted from SAP, 2001)

Thus we can see that certain strategic paradigms have permeated the way enterprise systems
are implemented. Enterprise systems are often seen as a means of implementing corporate
strategy (e.g., Bhattacherjee 2000; Davenport 2000a; Markus et al. 2000b).
However, while some researchers have acknowledged that changes in strategy are to be
expected in the longer term (Davenport 2000a; Larsen et al. 1999), few researchers in IS
have looked at the power struggles that may take occur when a company’s strategy and in
particular its enterprise integration strategy is formed and changes. In the organization we
studied, as the dominant actors, coalitions, and political agendas changed over time, so too
did the company’s enterprise integration strategy. Potentially, this throws into question the
value of a one-way translation from strategy to processes that is assumed by some ERP
vendors.
Our research shows that the company’s enterprise integration strategy was a corporate
battleground. Within the context of this corporate battleground, organizational defensive
routines hindered the achievement of better understanding between parties to resolve
strategically important issues. It is this failure to learn that is the focus of this paper.
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Figure 2 - SAP’s and Cap Gemini Consulting’s View of How Porter’s Value Chain Relates to Benefits
that Can Come from an ERP project (adapted from SAP 2001)

3. Theoretical Background
We decided to analyse the failure to learn during the implementation of this enterprise system
using the theory of organizational defensive routines developed by Argyris and Schon (1978;
1996). The theory of defensive routines has been used in the organizational learning
movement (Argyris et al. 1996; Kim 1993; Senge 1990), in general management (Senge
1990), and system dynamics (Sterman 2000). A few researchers have also used this theory in
information systems (Henfridsson et al. 2000; Sallaway 1987).
Organizational defensive routines is based on the theory of action perspective (Argyris et al.
1978; Argyris et al. 1996). Argyris and Schon (1974; 1978) based this perspective in part on
Bateson’s (1972) four levels of learning. However, Argyris and Schon (1978) have adopted
only three of the four levels of learning: single loop, double loop and deutero learning
(learning to learn).
Within the theory of action perspective an organization has a theory of action that consists of
norms, strategies and assumptions. For example, a sugar cane refinery would have strategies
that provide the rationale for harvesting cane instead of buying it from an intermediary. It
would also have norms for performance such as a 15 percent per annum growth rate. Also,
there would be assumptions that harvesting and processing sugar cane in a particular manner
will be the most cost-effective way to conduct business. (Note that the term “strategy” used
within the theory of action perspective differs slightly from the other notions of corporate
strategy (e.g., Porter 1996). We will clearly distinguish this by using the term “theory-ofaction strategy”).
Single loop learning occurs when correction is done to the process through changes in theoryof-action strategies and/or assumptions but the norms do not undergo change. Double loop
learning, on the other hand, involves changes in norms as well as perhaps theory-of-action
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strategies or assumptions whereas deutero learning involves learning how to learn. Put in
another way, single loop learning does not involve a change in the master program (or the
governing values mentioned below) that causes the organization to perpetuate errors but
double loop learning does (Argyris 1993).
Organizational defensive routines are: “actions or policies that prevent individuals or
segments of the organisation from experiencing embarrassment or threat. Simultaneously,
they prevent people from identifying and getting rid of the causes of the potential
embarrassment or threat. Organisational defensive routines are anti-learning, overprotective,
and self-sealing” (Argyris 1990, p. 25). These defensive routines are rooted in what Argyris
and Schon call the Model I type of human behaviour summarized in Table 1.
The four governing values in the left column of the table represent norms and interpretive
schemas that underlie unproductive action strategies. As a result of these values, unintended
consequences of action such as a manager being seen as defensive, inconsistent, or
controlling occur. When this happens, it is difficult to enter into productive dialogue to
question the underlying assumptions of a course of action. Eventually, this manager does not
revise some faulty assumptions, leading to decreased long term effectiveness.
Argyris and Schon distinguish between Model I social virtues (counter-productive behaviours
that inhibit double loop learning) and Model II social virtues (complementary behaviours that
facilitate double loop learning). These two models are described in Table 2.
This model II theory-in-use is based on the governing values of “valid information”,
“informed choice” and “individual responsibility to monitor how well the choice is
implemented.” This individual responsibility includes monitoring how well one designs and
implements his or her decisions in order to detect and correct errors. These governing values
form the foundation for two action strategies:
• Advocate one’s position and encourage inquiry or confirmation of it. This action
strategy involves forthrightly expressing one’s views while providing illustrations of
fairly observable data, e.g., what was seen and heard. The reason for doing so is to
invite examination and discussion of the reasoning process that has led to one’s
conclusion.
• Minimization of unilateral face-saving. Actions taken to save face, for yourself or
someone else, are considered an act of mistrust of the other person’s capacities. Such
acts should be assessed.
These action strategies have been found to lead to productive reasoning where individuals
make their premises and inferences explicit and clear (Argyris 1990).
The use of defensive routines as a lens helps us understand why actors may not be able to
resolve contradictions inherent in organizational life.
The use of defensive routines does have its limitations. For example, the theory of defensive
routines assumes that organizational members altruistically want to solve the problems they
see around them. It does not cater for situations where actors purposely act to fulfil their
hidden agendas at the expense of the organization.
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Governing
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Define goals
and try to
achieve them

Action Strategies

Maximize
winning and
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Own and control the task.
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Unilaterally protect others from
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behaviour, hold private
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expressing
negative
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Be rational

Design and manage the
environment unilaterally. (Be
persuasive, appeal to larger
goals, etc.)

Consequences for
behavioural world
Actor seen as defensive,
inconsistent,
incongruent,
controlling, fearful of
being vulnerable,
withholding of feelings,
overly concerned about
self and others
Defensive interpersonal
and group relationship
(dependence on actor,
little helping of others).
Defensive norms
(mistrust, lack of risktaking, conformity,
external commitment,
emphasis on diplomacy,
power-centred
competition and
rivalry).

Consequences
for learning
Self-sealing

Effectivenes
s
Decreased
long term
effectiveness

Single-loop
learning

Little testing of
theories publicly
Much testing of
theories privately

Low freedom of choice,
internal commitment
and risk-taking.

Table 1 - Model I Theory-in-Use (adapted from Argyris et al. 1978)
Model I Social Virtues

Model II Social Virtues
Help and Support
Give approval and praise to others. Tell others what Increase the others’ capacity to confront their own
you believe will make them feel good about ideas, to create a window into their own mind, and to
themselves. Reduce their feelings of hurt by telling face their un-surfaced assumptions, biases, and fears
them how much you care, and if possible, agree with by acting in these ways toward other people.
them that the others acted improperly.
Respect for Others
Defer to other people and do not confront their Attribute to other people a high capacity for selfreasoning or actions.
reflection and self-examination without becoming so
upset that they lose their effectiveness and their sense
of self-responsibility and choice. Keep testing this
attribution opening.
Strength
Advocate your position in order to win. Hold your own Advocate your position and combine it with inquiry
position in the face of advocacy. Feeling vulnerable is and self-reflection. Feeling vulnerable while
a sign of weakness.
encouraging inquiry is a sign of strength.
Honesty
Tell other people no lies or tell others all you think and Encourage yourself and other people to say what they
feel.
know yet fear to say. Minimize what would otherwise
be subject to distortion and cover-up of the distortion.
Integrity
Stick to your principles, values and beliefs.
Advocate your principles, values and beliefs in a way
that invites inquiry into them and encourages other
people to do the same.
Table 2 - Comparison between Model I and Model II Social Virtues (Argyris 1990), p. 106 - 107)
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4. Research Method
As was mentioned earlier, one of the authors studied Stark – one of many subsidiaries within
the Solteria group - using critical ethnography. Ethnographic research has emerged as one
important method for studying the social and organizational contexts of IS development and
use (Harvey et al. 1995; Myers 1999). Critical ethnography is one particular kind of
ethnographic research (Myers 1997).
The data was obtained over a six-year period in total, from 1996-2001, with the most
intensive period of fieldwork being from August 1999 to August 2000. Data sources
included interviews, informal chats, meetings, observation, the company’s Intranet, and
various documents such as e-mails, annual reports, and newspaper articles.
One hundred and five formal interviews were conducted (most of which were audio taped)
with 69 people. Many informal discussions with employees also took place. As well as
interviews, meetings were attended at various levels and departments.

5. Enterprise Integration at Stark
Stark is a small-to-medium sized enterprise within a large conglomerate within the AsiaPacific region (called Solteria). Solteria was one of the global 500 companies with annual
revenues of more than US$4 billion. The organisation structure of the Solteria empire for the
year 2000 is shown in the next figure.

Solteria

Sharpe Associates

Konstructor

CeremCo

Flavion Division

General Products

Xenon

BlackBird Industries

SEKTOR

Stark
Industries Limited

Trimark Limited

Manufacturing

PipeCo

RockCo

Figure 3 - Organizational Structure of Solteria Limited (2000)

Stark employs around 700 people and is now comprised of five businesses: CamCo, MaxCo,
HinoCo, DrinCo and ModCo. Prior to November 1999, Xenon was also part of Stark.
1993 - A Change of Strategy
In February 1993 David Callon assumed the role of general manager of Stark. Prior to his
arrival, the three business units ⎯ MaxCo, Xenon and CamCo ⎯ were merged to form a new
entity: Stark Industries Limited. An enterprise integration movement now began at Stark.
Stark was restructured along regional lines to achieve greater market awareness and customer
focus (this was in contrast to the previous emphasis on production). With the reorganization
also came the consolidation of administrative centres.
Under David Callon there was a change of strategy for the company. It was decided that
Stark would not longer focus on production, but would become the marketing arm of the
SEKTOR Group of companies. Stark would focus on the creation of new markets, the
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transformation of its product-oriented mindset and culture to one of providing customers with
end-user system solutions, and differentiation through better service. Stark believed that it
had to transform itself from a traditional product-focused business to a service-oriented
business.
After this strategic review, Stark undertook many projects with the aim of developing a new
corporate identity, developing new corporate capabilities, and changing the organization. One
of these was a Strategic Information Technology Project (SITP).
1995 - The ERP Project
The Strategic Information Technology Project was undertaken from June 1994 to May 1995
and was assisted by a large global consulting company (herein called BigFive Consulting).
Stark recognized that the information systems of Stark needed to be linked to its strategic
business plan.
The primary objective of the SITP was “to achieve greater integrity, reliability, timeliness
and usefulness of information available to Stark management.” The SITP team with the help
of BigFive Consulting recommended that “Stark seek an integrated packaged software
product to support all if not most of the business functions.” The new system was expected to
support a new re-engineered process, namely, the centralized order acceptance and delivery
process for Stark. This would involve a new centralized order acceptance and delivery centre
that would centralize order acceptance and delivery across MaxCo, CamCo and Xenon.
After a long software search period, Stark selected DAREA (a pseudonym for one of the top
five ERP vendors in the world).
The new system was chosen to support a corporate culture and work environment that was
yet to be created. This new corporate world would involve the consolidation not only of
plants within CamCo (that were currently competing against each other) but also of the three
main businesses of Stark. These sister businesses did not get along well with each other.
Traditionally, most of the companies within the Solteria empire were fairly autonomous. The
Solteria conglomerate as a whole had a cultural norm of commensurate authority,
responsibility and accountability at the business unit level.
However, this cultural norm was now diametrically opposed to what was proposed with the
new ERP system. The new system would require a certain degree of cooperation and process
standardization.
Old-timers versus New-timers
At the highest level of Stark, there were two groups: the New-timers and the Old-timers. The
New-timers were comprised of the then general manager of Stark, David Callon, and several
senior managers. The New-timers believed that new technology was needed to improve the
business.
The Old-timers believed the business was as simple as it always had been. Therefore, these
new initiatives served only to over-complicate the business. In their opinion, there were only
a few fundamental things one needed to do to run the business well.
Wyatt Dunkins, the current leader of the Old-timers, had been with the Stark since the early
1980s and had been part of the team that expanded the business. He was considered one of
the most powerful figures in Stark.
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1997-1998: The Strategic Debates
Although Stark had yet to fully implement its new ERP system, there were debates at senior
levels of Solteria and Flavion on the fundamental role that Stark would play within the Sector.
Wyatt Dunkins, one of the Old-timers, lobbied for a change in Stark’s strategic role and
enterprise integration strategy with the CEOs of SEKTOR and Flavion. He argued that the
three main businesses of Stark should be managed in a more separate manner. The end result
of these debates was a decision to change Stark from a marketing arm of SEKTOR to that of
production i.e. back to what it was before! In late 1998 Gene Romm succeeded David Callon
as the new CEO of Stark.
[The change of Stark’s strategic role has] certainly taken place since I left [in
December 1998]. But [it was] starting to take place a little bit over the
implementation [of] Project Bridge. We’re challenging, at senior levels in Solteria
about what role Stark was to have inside the SEKTOR [group of companies] –
whether it was about strategic growth or whether it was just an operating unit that was
at the end of the value chain and we wanted to keep it tight and simple. (Interview
with David Callon, General Manager of Stark from 1993 to 1998, 16 February 2001)
1999: New Leader, Different Vision
Gene Romm did not share the same integrated company vision as David Callon. Instead of a
tightly integrated company, Gene Romm espoused a clearer separation between MaxCo,
CamCo and the individual businesses of Stark. This stood in contrast to the previous CEOs
view that Stark’s businesses should be tightly coordinated. The previous enterprise
integration strategy for Stark was starting to unravel.
2000: Post-Implementation
By the end of 1999, Stark had managed to roll-out DAREA throughout the whole country.
However, Stark employees generally hated DAREA. Worse, most senior managers believed
that DAREA had been a bad investment. The new CEO of the SEKTOR group thought that
DAREA was inferior to another ERP product usually widely throughout the group.
In February 2000 the Stark ERP Support team considered various options to upgrade
DAREA to a later version. However, given the latest business strategy for Stark, they decided
to move towards splitting the “sales and distribution” tables shared by MaxCo and CamCo. In
hindsight, they considered that these two businesses were too tightly integrated.
In summary, we can see that David Callon, appointed CEO in 1993, had a strategy of creating
a tightly integrated, service-oriented company. DAREA was chosen and implemented to
support that strategy. However, David Callon, along with his strategy, left in 1999. Of the
twelve managers who signed off the ERP project at the start, only three were left by
December 2000.
Now Stark had a new CEO and a new strategic vision. This strategic vision was diametrically
opposed to David Callon’s vision, but almost identical to what it had been before he came
along. This meant that DAREA was designed for a world that would never exist.
“It didn’t take a 180 degree turn but it, sort of, we were quite expansionist and
visionary and we came back to a very conservative operational [focus] and … so it
wasn’t a dramatic change but it was more a degree of how expansionist we would
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have been had we wound the dial back a little bit to be more conservative. But that –
that did have an implication on [the] DAREA [project] and would we have chosen
DAREA or a similar ERP system if we had the more conservative vision? Probably
not.” (Interview with David Callon, initiator of the ERP project when he was the
General Manager of Stark from 1993 to 1998, 27 July 2000, emphasis added)

6. Analysis
In this section we will analyze our data using three themes: conflict of strategic paradigms,
influence of dominant actors, and organizational defensive routines.
Conflict of Strategic Paradigms
At a deeper level, one can observe a conflict of strategic paradigms between two opposing
camps: the New-timers and Old-timers. The New-timers believed that Stark should compete
on the basis of service and on-time delivery, whereas the Old-timers believed that Stark
should complete on the basis of social capital accumulation and maintenance. Nowhere was
this more evident than at the centralized order acceptance and delivery centre.
The centre was the epitome of Stark’s enterprise integration efforts. By the end of 1999 the
strategies of the New-timers had been inscribed into the centre’s processes and systems (c.f.
Orlikowski 2000). However, the centre never achieved the results of the dream of integration.
This was because the centre was designed to ensure on-time predictable product delivery as a
key differentiator for competitive advantage. However, from time to time, Wyatt Dunkins or
the Auckland Sales Manager (of the Old-timers) would force a large order through the
already congested product delivery schedule to please a big customer. This was because, in
his view, Stark depended on good social capital accumulation and maintenance with large
customers. These customers would call up on one day and make demands that their order be
put ahead of others. Wyatt Dunkins did not want to lose these big customers (and he was
prepared to disadvantage smaller customers and disrupt the delivery schedule if needed).
Just one year later, the reengineered centralized order acceptance and delivery centre was
split. This put an end to the dream of “mission control” that was pursued by David Callon.
The Old-timers had won.
The influence of dominant actors
After Stark was formed from its constituent businesses, the New-timers attempted to develop
a single corporate identity and chose a new ERP system to support the vision of a more
tightly integrated, service-oriented firm. However this vision, along with the new ERP system,
was diametrically opposed to some entrenched social structures and the values of the Oldtimers. The Old-timers opposed the integration effort.
But by the time Stark’s strategic role was changed back to being a production arm of the
sector, DAREA had already been inscribed with the intentions of the New-timers. DAREA
was like a freight train that was almost impossible to stop.
Organizational Defensive Routines
We suggest that overcoming organizational defensive routines may be important in
information technology enabled enterprise integration projects. Strategic debates on
important, conflicting and sensitive issues are often implicated in enterprise integration
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efforts. We suggest that resolution of these debates is crucial for a company’s strategic
objectives and competitive strategies to be realized in an enterprise system.
Due to space constraints, we will focus on just one issue: the unresolved conflict between the
strategies of the New-timers and Old-timers. The New-timers advocated competing via
predictable on-time delivery, whereas the Old-timers advocated competing via accumulation
and preservation of social capital. While one might argue that the pursuit of both strategies
was not mutually exclusive, in Stark they were debated as such. This unresolved debate can
be understood by drawing on the concepts of single loop learning, double loop learning and
defensive routines (Argyris 1990; Argyris et al. 1978; Argyris et al. 1996).
The next figure summarizes the two competing strategies as single loop learning systems that
were never effectively resolved by undertaking double loop learning. Double loop learning
could have helped Stark effectively address apparent but not fundamental contradictions
between the two strategies. The unresolved strategic debate trickled down to the design and
operations of the centralized order acceptance and delivery centre.

Single Loop Learning at the Strategic Level

Process (Order Acceptance & Delivery)
Inputs

Norms, Strategies & Assumptions
remain untouched by single loop learning

Results
Errors
Detected

Competitive Strategy 1: Competing on Predictable On-Time Delivery
Theory-of-action Strategies: The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Norms:
Predictable Reliable On-Time Delivery results in increased volume sold
Assumptions: By providing reliable on-time delivery to customers, Stark would differentiate
themselves from its competitors

Competitive Strategy 2: Competing on Social Capital
Theory-of-action Strategies: The sales & marketing, manufacturing and delivery of the
product as the best means to achieve corporate goals
Maintenance of patronage of big customers equals volume that in turn
translates to maintenance of revenue streams
Assumptions: Serving large customers over time, that in turn develops social capital, is the
most effective manner to maximize corporate effectiveness
Norms:

Figure 4 - Single Loop Learning at Stark that Results in Unresolved Competing Strategies

In the figure above, both competitive strategies were concerned with the sales, marketing,
manufacturing and delivery of the product to customers. However, the norms and
assumptions of these two competitive strategies differed. With competitive strategy 1, the
results of the order and delivery process are judged on whether on-time delivery has been
achieved. This is based on the expectation that predictable reliable on-time delivery over time
results in increased sales volume. With competitive strategy 2, the results of the order and
delivery process are judged on whether Stark maintained or enhanced its social capital with
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its big customers. The basic rationale of this strategy is that maintenance of social capital will
eventually result in guaranteed future sales. With regard to the differences between the
assumptions of the two competitive strategies, both appear diametrically opposed.
It appears to us that both camps (the New Timers and the Old Timers) failed to resolve these
conflicting strategies productively. The result was the non-achievement of the on-time
delivery strategy and widespread dissatisfaction with the ERP system.
It is widely recognized that the linkages between strategy, strategic objectives, key
performance indicators and the capability accorded by the enterprise system are crucial in the
realization of benefits in enterprise systems investments (Davenport 2000a; SAP 2001)).
However, as the discussion above shows, unresolved strategic debates (cf. Argyris et al. 1996)
may also lead to a waste of effort in integrating the enterprise. We suggest the lack of
resolution of these debates may be due to organizational defensive routines that prevent
mutual learning taking place.

7. Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the implementation of an enterprise system in a smallmedium sized organization within a large conglomerate within the Asia-Pacific region. We
have seen that enterprise integration at Stark was a corporate battleground. Unfortunately, a
strategically important debate within Stark was not resolved before the viewpoint of one
party (the New-timers) was inscribed into Stark’s enterprise system. We have suggested that
the resolution of this debate was hindered by organizational defensive routines. In our view,
organizational defensive routines hindered the achievement of better understanding between
parties to resolve strategically important issues. By the time the system went live, the
company’s enterprise integration strategy had already changed. The end result was a new
ERP system designed to support a future corporate world and work environment that never
arrived. Given the prevalence of defensive routines and political power plays in
organizational life (Argyris 1992; Argyris 1993; Argyris 1999), we believe our findings may
be applicable across a wide range of organisations. Further research is needed to find out if
failure to learn is a common feature of enterprise systems implementation efforts.
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